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UNITED STA TES V. JANIS:
DEMISE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND
REINSTATEMENT OF THE "SILVER PLATTER"
DOCTRINE IN FEDERAL CIVIL TAX CASES
by
Charles P. Quarterman*
OB.B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972, University of Mississippi; L.L.M. (Taxation) 1977,
University of Florida; Associate, Wells, Wells, Marble & Hurst, Jackson, Mississippi.
HIS paper addresses a relatively narrow area of the law which
has developed from the broad field of litigation surrounding the
fourth amendment ' to the United States Constitution. The set-
ting is a federal civil tax trial, where the federal government sought to
utilize evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment by
state authorities acting in their official capacities, as a basis for the
civil assessment of taxes.
In November 1968 the Los Angeles police obtained a warrant for
the search of two apartments and the persons of Morris A. Levine and
respondent Max Janis. The aim of the search was to find and seize
bookmaking paraphernalia; based upon police officer Weissman's
affidavit, the warrant was issued by a municipal court. The search
produced the sought-after records and $4,940 in cash. Soon
thereafter, Weissman contacted an IRS agent, who analyzed the
wagering records, determined the amount of respondent's gambling
activity for the five days preceding the search, and made an assess-
ment jointly against respondent and Levine for wagering taxes.' The
cash seized was levied upon in partial satisfaction of the deficiency.
'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
'The wagering tax provisions are found in 26 U.S.C. § 4401. The assessment of
$89,026.09 was arrived at by computing the average daily gross proceeds during the
five-day period represented by the seized evidence then multiplying the resulting figure
by 77, the number of days respondent was under police surveillance.
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Respondent and Levine were charged in municipal court with
violation of the local gambling law. Ironically, the suppression hear-
ing was held before the same judge who issued the warrant, and the
motion to suppress was granted under Spinelli v. United States. I Con-
sequently, the judge ordered the return of all items seized, except for
the cash previously levied upon by the IRS.
In June 1969 respondent filed a claim for refund of the $4,940.
The claim was denied, and in December 1970 respondent Janis filed
suit for that amount in district court. The government answered and
counterclaimed for the balance of the assessment.
Prior to trial, both parties stipulated that the sole basis of the
assessment was the items seized pursuant to the warrant and the infor-
mation given to the IRS agent by Weissman. Janis moved to suppress
the evidence seized, along with copies of such evidence retained by the
IRS. The district court granted the motion and ordered that the
assessment be quashed." In an unpublished memorandum without
opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.
The Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of burden of proof in
the two separate elements of the litigation - the refund suit by Janis
and the collection suit of the United States by counterclaim. In a re-
fund suit, the taxpayer has the burden of proof as to the amount of
the recovery,' and he must overcome the presumption of correctness
that attaches to the assessment. 6 The Court concluded that the
burden of proof would rest with the taxpayer.
7
The Court, using the deterrence argument, held that the exclu-
sionary rule does not apply in a civil tax proceeding where an officer
committed a "good faith" violation of the fourth amendment.
Since the crime of tax evasion is not an observable offense," very
few tax cases involve search and seizure questions. The proof of the
crime is rarely made by direct evidence, but by circumstantial proof of
'The case of Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), which was decided short-
ly after the search warrant in the instant case was executed, requires that an affidavit in
support of the warrant must set forth, in sufficient detail, the underlying circumstances
to afford the magistrate an independent determination of the informant's reliability.
'The Court held that the warrant failed the tests of Spinelli and Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964). The district court held that Janis was entitled to the refund with
interest, "for the reason that substantially all, if not all, of the evidence utilized by the
defendants herein in making their assessment.. .was illegally obtained, and, as such, the
assessment was invalid." 73-1 USTC 16,083 at 81,392 (1973).
'See generally 10 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 58A.35
(976).
'Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
428 U.S. at 441. The Court assumed that if the evidence seized could not be used as
a basis for the assessment, then the district court was correct in granting judgment for
Janis. In note II of the opinion, the Court saw no difference between use of evidence in
formulating the assessment, and its use in the case-in-chief.
'Avakian, Searches and Seizures, 1959 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 531, 541.
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the elements. 9 It would be highly improbable for a federal or state of-
ficer to illegally break into a person's home and find evidence of
willfulness to evade federal tax law, unless in the rare instance a dou-
ble set of books is found. As a result, the incentive for police to make
an illegal entry for purposes of obtaining proof of tax evasion usually
is not present.. This rationale, however, will not necessarily prevent
fourth amendment abuses from arising where state or federal officers
are investigating the commission of another type of crime, such as
gambling, and conduct a search which uncovers gambling objects.
The authorities have evidence of possible criminal violations involving
more than one jurisdiction, ranging from state law violations to
federal tax evasion. The latter crime may involve federal civil tax
fraud,"I the penalty for which is designed to collect revenue and reim-
burse the federal government for the high expense of investigations, as
well as for the losses occasioned by acts of fraud.' 2
At issue is an evidentiary crossover from state criminal pro-
ceedings to a federal civil tax fraud case,- and many will argue or
presume that United States v. Janis3 has settled, once and for all, the
issue of whether or not evidence illegally seized by state authorities can
be used in a federal civil trial. This paper examines the background of
the fourth amendment and attempts to fill gaps occasioned by Janis.
The discussion necessarily includes the exclusionary rule itself and its
future.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Courts are confronted daily with balancing the power of the
government to invade the privacy of one's home in order to gain
evidence of wrongdoing with the constitutional right of citizens to be
secure in their "persons, houses, papers, and effects."" If society is
'Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943); Smith v. United States, F.2d 168
(6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957). See also I.R.C. § 7201 for the
elements required to be proven in order to convict a person for income tax evasion.
"Ayakian, supra note 8, at 541. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976),
which indicates that the fifth amendment self-incrimination argument can no longer be
made by one whose books and records are legally seized pursuant to a search warrant.
This case may indicate more frequent uses of search warrants by the Commissioner,
where the use of the IRS summons found in 1.R.C. § 7602 would be impractical, such as
when recommendation for prosecution. has already been made. See generally Donald v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971), for the test of when an IRS summons may not be us-
ed; and Lipton, Search Warrant in the Tax Fraud Investigations, 56 A.B.A.J. 941
(1970).
"I.R.C. § 6653 (b) provides in pertinent parts: "If any part of any underpayment
... of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax
an amount equal to 50 percent of the underpayment."
"Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
"428 U.S. 433 (1976), reh. denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976).
"U.S. CONST. amend IV.
1978]
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to safeguard the right to privacy, it should afford redress to the in-
dividual for acts in violation of this right.
Society has fostered a belief that the law enforcement process
treats the law-abiding citizen equitably. This belief has caused the in-
dividual to forget that the conception of this attitude was the result of
the presence of presumably fail-safe devices which prevent the erosion
of constitutional rights. As a result, a citizen, sometimes even with
the knowledge that he is the suspect, 5 may be willing to fully
cooperate with authorities in allowing them to search his house.
Courts in criminal cases will exclude evidence obtained by an
"unreasonable search or seizure." This conclusion is derived from
the words of the fourth amendment itself and needs no addition by the
courts. Conversely, one would gather that fruits of "reasonable"
searches or seizures would be allowed into evidence. Thereby, the
question of what constitutes "reasonableness" pervades every sup-
pression hearing." Since the fourth amendment does not address
situations where evidence is obtained by other means, if there is no
search or seizure, the question of reasonableness.is never reached.'
Noting that a jail shares no similarity, in terms of privacy, with a
home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room," the Supreme Court
in Lanza v. New York"' rejected the argument that a public jail was
the equivalent of a person's "house" and apparently limited the ap-
plicability of the fourth amendment to instances involving persons,
houses, papers, and effects.
Since the issue of "reasonableness" has been considered extensive-
ly in the literature, this discussion presumes that a particular search or
seizure either is or is not violative of the fourth amendment. This
presumption is the foundation for the principal question of whether
evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment should be ad-
missible in a federal civil tax trial. The term "illegal search and
seizure" refers to a search or seizure that does not meet fourth amend-
ment standards, not that it is merely in violation of state law."
"Avakian, supra note 8, at 531.
"In the federal courts, the procedure to be used by the defense is enunciated in FED.
R. CRIM. P. § 41(e). For the procedure to be used prior to indictments, see DiBella v.
United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962).
'United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).
"Id. at 143. These latter locales had been held previously as constitutionally pro-
tected areas in the following cases: Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920); Goulded v.. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921): (business locale); Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (store);
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951)
(hotel room).
"1370 U.S. 139, 144 (1962)..
"United States v. Dudek, 530 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1976). There the court refused to
suppress where failure to comply with a state rule for making prompt return of the
search warrant and for verifying inventory related to an event which occurred after an
[Vol. 1: 1
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II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Prior to 1914, the admissibility of evidence in civil or criminal
trials was not affected even if such evidence had been procured in
violation of the fourth amendment. In that year, the Supreme Court
in Weeks v. United States2' made the admissibility of evidence depen-
dent upon the means by which the evidence was obtained. The exclu-
sion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights was not
new; the Court as early as 1886, in Boyd v. United States, " had pro-
vided that evidence was inadmissible where a person was compelled to
incriminate himself in violation of the fifth amendment.
In Weeks, the defendant was charged with use of the mails for lot-
tery purposes. The state and federal authorities had searched his
home twice without a warrant and had obtained incriminating letters
and correspondence. Alleging a violation of his fourth and fifth
amendment rights, the defendant petitioned for the return of all seized
materials. The Court traced the history of the fourth amendment to
the abominable general warrants in England and the writs of
assistance in the American colonies, both of which were used by
governmental authorities to search freely without judicial
supervision. 2 3 The Court cited Boyd for the proposition that the
essence of the offending procedure is not the physical act of breaking
doors or disturbing effects, rather the violation results from a breach
of a person's privacy.
The fourth amendment was looked upon not only as a grant of a
right, but also as a restraint upon the exercise of governmental
authority. To allow federal courts in criminal cases to admit evidence
obtained by illegal police activity would be to sanction the illegality.
The decision required that the correspondence seized by the federal
authorities be returned to the petitioner and its use suppressed 2' as
evidence at trial. The evidence illegally seized by state authorities,
however, was not suppressed, as the Court held that the fourth
amendment did not apply to state officials who were not acting as
agents of the federal government.
The Weeks decision, therefore, punished the federal authorities by
instituting the exclusionary rule in federal criminal trials. This
holding set the stage for new legal guidelines. A good example of
these guidelines is found in Byars v. United States" where a federal
otherwise valid search was completed. See also United States v. Scolnick, 392 F.2d 320
(3rd Cir. 1968).
"232 U.S. 383 (1914).
22116 U.S. 616 (1886).
"Avakian, supra note 8, at 537.
"The Author uses the words "suppressed" and " excluded" interchangeably.
"273 U.S. 28 (1927).
19781
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conviction was reversed on the grounds that the federal officer's level
of participation in a state search was sufficient to qualify as a joint
federal-state search.26 The Court treated this kind of search as one
which was conducted solely by federal agents. The issue for future
cases was whether, from all the facts adduced at trial, it could be said
that the federal agent participated sufficiently in the state search to
transform it into a joint federal-state search, thus yielding grounds for
suppression of evidence under Weeks and Byars.
Apart from this narrowly drawn issue, the Byars decision
specifically recognized the right of the federal government to utilize
evidence illegally and independently seized by state authorities.2" This
anomalous situation was aptly described by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
Lustig v. United States:21 "[A] search is a search by a federal official
if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence
secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on
a silver platter." 29 The Weeks and Byars decisions, therefore, permit-
ted the practice which became known as the "silver platter" doctrine.
The major obstacle in applying the rule3 0 to state court pro-
ceedings was the holding in Weeks that the fourth amendment applied
to federal, not state, officials. In Wolf v. Colorado," the Court
refused to apply the rule to state court proceedings but, by holding
that the right to privacy guaranteed to citizens under the fourth
amendment is enforceable against the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment' 3 laid the foundation for the
eventual application of the rule to such proceedings. In refusing to
exclude the evidence, the Court reasoned that to apply the rule would
be to reject other reasonable methods adopted by the states which had
"The Court noted the following facts which supported the proposition that the
federal officer was invited to join the search in his official capacity, and not as a private
individual: Instead of asking for additional state officials, the state officer in charge
specifically asked for the federal agent; the evidence obtained in the search (counterfeit
strip stamps to be used on bonded whiskey) not within the purview of the state search
warrant, nor did the evidence relate to any violation of state law; upon seizing the
evidence in question, all parties considered the federal agent to have the right to such
evidence. Id. at 32-33.
"The Court used the words, "improperly seized by state officers operating entirely
upon their own account." This language left the door open for use by federal officials
of evidence seized by state officers in blatant disregard of the fourth amendment as well
as inadvertent violations. Id. at 33.
21338 U.S. 74 (1949).
"Id. at 78-79.
"The exclusionary rule will hereinafter be referred to simply as the "rule."
'338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"Id. at 26-27. In order to reach such a conclusion, the Court relied upon the test
earlier laid down by Justice Cardozo, wherein he stated that the Due Process Clause ex-
acts from the states, for the lowest and the outcast, all that is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, (1937).
[Vol. : 1
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not followed Weeks. " Further, the Court suggested that while the
rule was needed as a deterrent to misconduct by federal officials, no
such compelling need justified its application to state and local
officials. The Court believed that the "wrath of public opinion" at
the local level would rise up and punish the offending local officers
more effectively than at the federal level."
The Court, however, did not wait long before making exceptions
to this general rule. In the case of Rochin v. California," a state nar-
cotics conviction was reversed because state police, without warrant or
other justification to search, caused petitioner's stomach to be
pumped, thereby producing morphine tablets which were later used as
evidence against him. The Court found the police activities so offen-
sive to "the concept of ordered liberty" that use of the rule was
justified.1
6
Two years later in Irvine v. California," the Court, declining to
exclude evidence of gambling obtained by local authorities who had
illegally entered petitioner's house and implanted a "bugging" device,
tilted in the opposite direction. Instead of finding the police activity
as offensive as that in Rochin, the Court described the exclusionary
rule as an incomplete remedy:
Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing of-
ficial, while it may and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant.
It deprives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker because he has
been pursued by another. It protects one against whom incriminating
evidence is discovered, but does nothing to protect innocent persons
who are the victims of illegal but fruitless searches.."
Thus, except for the most extreme cases, a state official could be in
violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments and still have the
illegal evidence admitted over objection at trial. The evidence could
also be used in a federal criminal trial. Assuming that no federal
official participated in the search, the same evidence could be used at
both state and federal levels.
39
"As of the date of the Wof decision, thirty states had rejected the Weeks doctrine,
seventeen states adhered to it, and one state (Iowa) had formulated the exclusionary rule
prior to Weeks. See Appendix to the Wolf opinion, 338 U.S. at 33-39.
'1 "The public opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted against
oppressive conduct on the part of the police directly responsible to the community itself
than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority
pervasively exerted throughout the country." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 32-33.
"342 U.S. 165 (1952).
"The Court noted that the facts stirred up more than second-thoughts of
overzealous police activity. "This is conduct which shocks the conscience... .They
[police activities used] are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of con-
stitutional differentiation." Id. at 172.
"347 U.S. 128 (1954).
"Id. at 136.
"See Janis, 428 U.S. at 445 n. 14. The Court stated that the fact that the exclu-
1978]
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Elkins v. United States" marked the death of the "silver platter"
doctrine as it related to criminal proceedings. In Elkins, petitioners
were indicted and tried for the federal offenses of intercepting and
divulging telephone communications and conspiring to do so." The
evidence consisted of recordings and a recording machine seized by
state officers from petitioner's home. Two state courts had held that
the search and seizure were unlawful, but the federal district judge ap-
plying Byars admitted the evidence. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed. Noting that even though the latter case
removed the "doctrinal underpinning" of the "silver platter"
doctrine, the federal courts continued to honor evidence seized illegal-
ly by state authorities.' 2 The Supreme Court traced the origin of the
rule from Weeks to Wolf and pointed out that to perpetuate the
"silver platter" doctrine would be to distinguish evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment from that obtained in violation of
the fourteenth amendment.' 3 The Court admitted that there were no
empirical statistics to reflect that those who lived in states that had
adopted the rule enjoyed more constitutional protection than those
living in states that allowed illegally seized evidence to be admitted."
In abrogating the "silver platter" doctrine, the Court seemed to rely
on the gradual move by state courts since Weeks to exclude evidence
illegally seized by state authorities;"4 more importantly, most of the
exclusionary states that had considered the issue held that evidence
illegally seized by federal officers must be excluded in a state court
proceeding if the means of obtaining such evidence violated state
law.'
sionary rule was not applied by the Supreme Court did not mean that widespread abuse
existed. On the contrary, tort remedies, internal disciplinary rules, and state-made ex-
clusionary rules allayed fears of blatant police activities.
"364 U.S. 206 (1960).
" Actually, the original search warrant did not call for the seizure of evidence of the
crimes charged, but instead called for the seizure of obscene pictures and recordings
related to such obscene materials. The state officers found paraphernalia believed to
have been used in making wiretaps. Id. at 207 n. I.
"See id., at 214 n. 6 (representative list of such cases).
"Id. at 215. "The Constitution is flouted equally in either case. To the victim it
matters not whether his constitutional right has been invaded by a federal agent or by a
state officer." (Footnote omitted). See also People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 22-23, 150
N.E. 585, 588 (1926), wherein Judge Cardozo noted that incongruity.
" To date, there appears no valid way to accurately measure the effect of the rule on
deterring illegal police activity. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970). See also Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An
Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 243
(1973).
"See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 219 where the Court commented that at that time not more
than half of the states continued to follow totally the rule that evidence is admissible, no
matter how obtained. See also Appendix to Elkins, 364 U.S. at 224-25.
"'Little v. State, 171 Miss. 818, 159 So. 103 (1935).
[Vol. 1:1
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Two of the more persuasive reasons used by the Court in Elkins to
support its holding were the concepts of "federalism" and "judicial
integrity." The Court stated that a healthy federal-state relationship,
which comprises "federalism," cannot be served where a federal court
sitting in an exclusionary state admits evidence illegally seized by state
authorities. In doing so, the federal court is frustrating state attempts
to insure constitutional liberties." "Judicial integrity," on the other
hand, not only relates to the relationship of the federal government to
the states, but to society in general. The words of Mr. Justice
Brandeis aptly expressed this doctrine: "Our government is the po-
tent, the omnipresent teacher. . . . If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.""
The Court discussed deterrence of illegal police activity as a reason
for the exclusionary rule, but it cited no empirical evidence to show
that the rule had, in the past, actually deterred illegal police activities.
Although the Court strained to give credence to the rule by pointing
out that since Weeks the Federal Bureau of Investigation had not been
rendered helpless, nor had federal courts been frustrated in their quest
for the administration of criminal justice, it did not venture to say
how much more effective criminal justice would have been had the
rule not been applied. By denying the federal government the right to
use evidence illegally seized by state authorities, the Supreme Court ef-
fectively ended the "silver platter" doctrine for criminal law pur-
poses.""
III. THE RATIONALE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Before considering Janis and other cases dealing with the exclu-
sionary rule in relation to civil cases, one needs to examine the reasons
why such a rule is required. Emphasis should be on whether federal
law in the form of the fourth and fourteenth amendments has been
violated, not whether the search or seizure is in violation of state or
"See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 33-39. Conversely, the Court noted, a federal
court sitting in a state in which the rule had not been adopted, would not frustrate state
policy by excluding evidence illegally seized by state officers. The Court stated that to
abolish the state-to-federal silver platter doctrine would not interfere at all with in-
dividual states' freedom to apply their own preventive measures, such as tort remedies
against police officers.
"See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928). See also McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
"A year later, the Supreme Court made the rule applicable to state court pro-
ceedings, where state officers had illegally seized evidence. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). Conversely, the California Supreme Court rejected the "reverse" silver platter
doctrine as contrary to Elkins. People v. Kelly, 66 Cal. 2d 232, 424 P.2d 947 (1967).
1978]
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local law.50 The rule is unique to the United States; Britain and other
civilized countries have not found it necessary to invoke its use."
Courts in the United States have continued to advance the premise
that deterrence of illegal police searches and seizures is promoted if
the rule is invoked, but this line of thinking is considerably weakened
by the lack of empirical evidence. Dallin H. Oaks has produced one
of the most thorough works in this area, 52 and he concluded that the
idea of excluding evidence illegally seized makes sense theoretically,
but the more than fifty years since the rule was invoked in Weeks have
not produced persuasive evidence that the rule does, in fact, deter il-
legal police activity. 3
Professor Charles Alan Wright concluded that the rule only
benefits criminals, as a search of an innocent person's house will pro-
duce no incriminating evidence to be suppressed."' Since courts are
still suppressing evidence, he surmised that the rule was an imperfect
deterrent tool. He noted several reasons why police, even with
knowledge that the rule will later be invoked, would conduct illegal
searches. First, police activities are sometimes carried out, not
necessarily to obtain convictions, but for other reasons.' Second,
police may not know or care whether evidence is eventually admitted
or excluded. Finally, even an officer acting in good faith will not
know all the intricacies of the federal law of searches and seizures and
may inadvertently violate the Constitution.
Wright concluded that the rule should be handled gingerly by the
courts and should be applied only in those circumstances where the
police flagrantly violate constitutional standards. 6  His solution
would allow the courts to use such evidence only if the illegal search or
seizure resulted from good-faith police practices. Professor Wright's
solution would hinge upon a case-by-case determination of whether
actions by police were made in "good faith." Such a subjective deter-
mination is often difficult and could lead to an even greater judicial
quagmire than the present one in the criminal area.
Although the exclusionary rule has been regarded as the protector
of an individual's fourth amendment freedoms, United States v.
"United States v. Sudek, 530 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1976). There, the court refused to
suppress where failure to comply with a state rule for making prompt return of the
search warrant and for verifying inventory, related to an event which occurred after an
otherwise valid search was completed. See also United States v. Scolnick, 392 F.2d 320
(3rd Cir. 1968).
"See Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free Because the Constable Has Blundered?,
50 TEX. L. REv. 736 (1972).
"See Oaks, supra note 44. See also Spiotto, supra note 44.
"See Oaks, supra note 44, at 671-72.
"See Wright, supra note 51, at 736-37.
"1Id. at 740.
'See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
[Vol. 1:1
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Calandra," which held that the rule does not apply to illegally seized
evidence presented before a federal grand jury, illustrates the degree
to which the Supreme Court has limited its application. The case in-
volved an illegal search conducted by federal agents, and the "silver
platter" doctrine was not in issue. However, Calandra represented a
shift of emphasis to deterrence of illegal police activity as the major
reason for excluding evidence. The Elkins opinion stressed the con-
cepts of "federalism" and "judicial integrity," whereas in Calandra,
the Court noted that the purpose of the rule was to deter "future
unlawful police conduct"" rather than to provide a remedy to the
search victim.19 In Calandra the rule was held to be judicially created
"to safeguard fourth amendment rights generally through its deter-
rent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party ag-
grieved." 60
The Court buttressed its restrictive application of the rule by ex-
plaining that no court has ever expressed the idea that the rule always
should be applied where evidence is seized illegally. The doctrine of
"standing" was given as an example of how courts do not apply the
rule unless "its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served.' 16 The Court explained that "standing" to assert the rule has
traditionally been granted only when the government seeks to use il-
legally obtained evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful
search.' It is only under these circumstances that the need for deter-
rence of illegal police activity is greater than the public need for ob-
taining a criminal conviction.
Another example of the Supreme Court's indecisiveness on the
issue of where to focus on fourth amendment rights is Alderman v.
United States.6 The Court, considering a question of standing, stated
that fourth amendment rights are personal rights which may not be
vicariously asserted. Is one to assume that those rights are personal to
the individual affected for purposes of determining standing as in
Alderman, yet not personal to the individual appearing before a grand
jury, as in Calandra?
Other doctrines, however, in addition to standing, have limited the
"414 U.S. 338 (1974).
"Id. at 347.
"The Court quoted the decision of Linklettery. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965),
"Mhe ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Repara-
tion comes too late." See also Critique, On the Limitions of Empirical Evaluations of
the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calan-
dra, 69 N.W.L. REv. 740 (1974).
"*414 U.S. at 348.
61/d.
621d.
"3394 U.S. 165 (1969).
19781
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application of the rule. In United States v. Stonehill," a district judge
allowed the United States to foreclose tax liens amounting to over
twenty-five million dollars on property owned by the taxpayers.
Evidence was obtained by means of an illegal raid" by Philippine
authorities on taxpayers' business premises in the Philippines, and
subsequently handed over to United States authorities on a "silver
platter." In allowing the admission of such evidence, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the fourth amendment could apply to raids by foreign
officials only if United States agents, by their level of participation,
had converted the search into a joint venture."
A similar refusal to apply the rule arises in a situation where an in-
dividual, not acting at the behest of the state or federal government,
conducts an illegal search and seizure and subsequently hands over the
evidence to federal authorities. 6' These cases indicate that no matter
how blatantly illegal the search and seizure is held to be, the evidence
will not be suppressed unless it was obtained by state or federal
governmental action. The cases also demonstrate that, except where
officials conducted the illegal search, the courts will refuse to apply
the rule in a broad-brush manner, for to do so would rob the pro-
secutors of relevant material which is sometimes the sole evidence
against the defendant.
Even though the rule has been narrowed in the areas of standing,
foreign searches, and individual searches independent of governmen-
tal authority, some jurists have considered totally eliminating the
rule. Since Janis may portend its death, it is even more important to
consider viable alternatives to the rule.
In an extensive dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents, 6 Chief Justice Burger went further than merely chastising the
rule for its ineffectiveness in its deterrence of illegal police activity; he
proposed alternatives to the rule, but expressed his opposition to the
immediate overruling of Weeks and Mapp until some other system
"420 F. Supp. 46 (C.D. Calif. 1976). This case has a long history, and the original
foreclosure suit was previously reported at 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 960 (1969). The Court in the foreclosure proceedings held that the denial of
the motion to suppress and affirmance by the Ninth Circuit in the earlier trial was not
res judicata as to the question of suppression of the evidence as the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply to an interlocutory order.
"The raid had been held to be illegal by Philippine and United States constitutional
standards. 405 F.2d at 743 (9th Cir. 1968).
"The underlying precept is that neither the fourth amendment, nor the rule, will ap-
ply to acts of foreign officials. Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967).
With this point established, a court need only apply the Byars test, to see if there was
sufficient U.S. federal participation in the search to justify classifying it as a U.S.
federal search. See United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976).
"Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
"-403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L.
REV. 1 (1964).
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was substituted." The majority opinion in Bivens held that,
regardless of absence of such remedy in the literal words of the fourth
amendment, a victim of an illegal federal search had a cause of action
against the federal agents conducting the search. The basis of
Burger's dissent was founded upon a "separation of powers" argu-
ment that the Court, by providing the remedy, was wrongfully exercis-
ing a Congressional prerogative."1
Burger's alternative proposal to the rule is that Congress should
enact legislation to waive sovereign immunity and to establish a quasi-
judicial forum, comparable to the United States Court of Claims, em-
powered to award money damages to aggrieved parties. This plan, of
course, would come with a proviso that the seized evidence which
would otherwise be admissible would not be excluded solely because it
was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment." Along with the
common disadvantage of forcing the aggrieved party to file an action
and wait for its disposition, the cost of this plan would be the pro-
liferation of the federal administrative structure. Whether the Burger
proposal would act as a deterrent to unlawful police conduct is ques-
tionable. Assuming it would, the plan's advantage would be great,
since it would allow the prosecutor to use relevant and material
evidence to prove his case. Although others have proposed similar
remedies,"2 the tort alternative will continue to carry with it the in-
herent weakness of burdening the aggrieved party with court costs, at-
torney's fees, and lengthy delays in getting to trial. The Burger pro-
posal, although fashionably streamlined in comparison to the or-
dinary tort remedy, is dependent entirely upon whether Congress will
enact sweeping legislation required to create such a system.
IV. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CIVIL TAX CASES
Prior to Janis, one of the most formidable cases which seemed to
support the exclusion of illegally seized evidence in a civil case was
Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States.' I This case involved
a criminal proceeding, but its language buttressed the rule's applica-
tion in the civil area. Federal authorities conducted an illegal search
of corporate premises and seized the corporation's books and records.
""Obviously the public interest would be poorly served if law enforcement officials
were suddenly to gain the impression, however erroneous, that all constitutional
restraints on police had somehow been removed-that an open season on 'criminals'
had been declared." Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971).
"Id. at 411-12.
I IId. at 422-23.
72Hoenig and Walker, The Tort Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 63 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 256 (1972); Coe, The ALI Substantiality Test: A
Flexible Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction, 10 GA. L. REv. 1 (1975).
"251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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The books and records were returned to petitioners pursuant to a
court order, but not before the authorities had made copies of them
and had issued a subpoena duces tecum for the return of the
originals. Contempt orders were issued, and an appeal was taken.
Holding that the government could not utilize knowledge illegally
gained to demand production of evidence by a more regular form (for
example, a subpoena duces tecum), the Supreme Court reversed. The
Court continued: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisi-
tion of evidence in a certain way is not merely that evidence so ac-
quired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be
used at all."" (Emphasis added).
In Rogers v. United States," the First Circuit Court of Appeals
held that illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible, where the
United States attempted to recover customs duties on liquors imported
into the country. Other cases"' have dealt with the rule in the context
of the civil area. The Tax Court's major pronouncement on this sub-
ject is Efrain T. SuareZ." The petitioner was a doctor whose office
was searched illegally by local authorities who seized his books and
records and used this evidence to gain a conviction for conspiracy to
commit abortion and for attempted abortion." A few days later,
copies of the clinic's daily records were given to the Internal Revenue
Service, which proceeded to use such evidence as the sole basis for a
statutory notice of deficiency. In applying the rule, Judge Hoyt read
the fourth amendment literally to conclude that its own language
draws no distinction between criminal and civil cases. Citing
"Id. at 392.
"97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938). Note that although this case involved the collection of
custom duties, it was relevant to all civil actions prior to Janis involving the assessment
and collection of taxes, interest, and penalties.
"In Tovar v. Jarecki, 173 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1949), the court held that the assess-
ment for marijuana tax was penal in nature, not civil. The court allowed an injuction
against an assessment based upon illegally obtained evidence. In Jarecki v. Whetstone,
82 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1948), it was held that the fourth amendment applied where
an action was brought to enforce a summons requiring the defendant to produce books
and records disclosing financial conditions with respect to an investigation pertaining to
her income tax liability. The court in United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D.
Ohio 1966) directed that illegally seized evidence which was contraband be destroyed,
and that the illegally seized non-contraband items be returned to the taxpayer who was
the subject of a tax assessment.
1"58 T.C. 792 (1972). Compare this case with that of John W. Singleton, 65 T.C.
1123 (1976). There, an airport search of a taxpayer's person produced large amounts of
cash. When this fact was discovered later by the IRS, the cash was made a basis for a
statutory notice of deficiency. The Tax Court held that the airport search violated the
taxpayer's rights, but nonetheless refused to apply Suarez because the connection be-
tween the illegally obtained evidence and the commissioner's proof became so at-
tenuated so as to dissipate the taint of the search.
"58 T. C. at 799 (1972).
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language in Olmstead, " he ignored the deterrence issue and founded
his opinion on the doctrine of judicial integrity.
V. THE JANIS DECISION
The Supreme Court in Janis refused to apply the exclusionary rule
in a civil tax proceeding where the offending state officer committed a
good faith violation of the fourth amendment. Using the deterrence
rationale for the rule, the Court seized upon the fact that no empirical
data exists to support the efficacy of the rule." The Court noted that
if the rule is as efficient as its supporters claim, then sufficient deter-
rence has been reached in the criminal area, without the necessity of
extending it to civil cases. On the other hand, if the rule merely pro-
vides marginal deterrence in the criminal area, then since the deter-
rence is attenuated by the fact that another sovereign uses the
evidence, it should not be extended to the civil area."I The Court con-
cluded that the costs to society in excluding the evidence would be too
extensive and that the probability of deterrence would be small.' 2
The Court dismissed the line of cases cited by Janis as involving
only "intrasovereign" violations'" and concluded that Suarez" was
incorrect because it did not focus on deterrence and because the Tax
Court did not distinguish between intersovereign and intrasovereign
uses of unconstitutionally seized material." In an extensive
footnote, 6 the Court, in order to negate the Suarez holding, refused
to apply the "judicial integrity" doctrine. By intertwining the deter-
rence issue with judicial integrity, the Court surmised that if no deter-
rence results from the rule's application, then the admission of
evidence in a federal civil proceeding is unlikely to encourage fourth
amendment violations." Thus, the Court reasoned, it follows that
judicial integrity remains intact since no such violations are committed
or encouraged. The Court overlooked the fact that even though the
violation against Janis was committed "in-good faith," to admit
evidence might encourage more vigorous cooperation between state
"277 U.S. 438 (1928); 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
"428 U.S. at 453.
"Id. at 453, n. 27.
"Id. at 453-54.
"Id. at 456. See Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969); Knoll Associates Inc. v. F.T.C., 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir.
1968); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (1966); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils Inc.,
281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968); United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D.
Ohio 1966). See also Hand v. United States, 441 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1971).
'158 T.C. 792 (1972).
"428 U.S. at 457.
"Id. at 458, n. 35.
"I/d,
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and federal agencies in the civil area after the courts have determined
that such evidence could not be used in a criminal trial.
Justice Stewart in a dissenting opinion" considered the issue of in-
tersovereign cooperation. He focused upon the dual purpose of the
wagering taxes: to raise revenue and to aid state and federal
authorities in enforcing criminal penalties against gambling
violators. 9 The close proximity of the civil action to the criminal area
led Stewart to observe that close cooperation between these two
sovereigns might result and that
[S]ociety must not only continue to pay the high cost of the exclu-
sionary rule (by foregoing criminal convictions which can be obtained
only on the basis of illegally seized evidence) but it must also forfeit the
benefit for which it has paid so dearly.'"
That such cooperation between state and federal officials exists is
clear from the facts of this case, as well as from other sources."
A careful distinction should be made between purely civil actions,
as in Janis, and forfeiture proceedings, where the evidence seized is
sought to be destroyed or sold by the sovereign, instead of being
returned to the rightful owner. The latter proceeding has been
characterized in Boyd as "quasi-criminal" in nature, 92 and, as such,
the evidence would be excluded under Weeks and Mapp. The disturb-
ing factor in Janis, which Stewart points out in his dissenting opinion,
is that these civil penalty provisions not only serve to raise revenue,
but also assist state and federal authorities in the enforcement of
criminal sanctions and thus take on a quasi-criminal nature. Thus
Janis may signal a future move by the Court to abrogate the rule's
operation in a situation similar to that found in One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania.'3 The Supreme Court held that in a pro-
"1428 U.S. at 460.
"Id. at 461. Stewart cites Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), and
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), to the effect that the wagering taxes are
primarily aimed at a group inherently suspect of criminal conduct, and that those who
properly assert the privilege against self incrimination with respect to the wagering tax
may not be criminally punished for failure to comply with their requirements.
"0428 U.S. at 463.
"The Asterisk accompanying the text at 462 of the opinion contains questions asked
of Officer Weissman, and his responses. They clearly show that he would probably
contact the IRS whenever a "major-size book" is seized. See INT. Rav. MANUAL, Ch.
9900, Sec. 283.3 (4) (1975), for an indication that the IRS is well aware of such coopera-
tion.
'"116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). The fourth amendment does not insure a return of all
property illegally seized. See DeRevil, Applicability of the Fourth Amendment in Civil
Cases, 1963 DUKE L. J. 472, 485 (1963).
"380 U.S. 693 (1965). Most cases predating this case applied the Boyd rationale to
exclude illegally seized evidence in forfeiture cases. United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d
897 (10th Cir. 1946); United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949).
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ceeding to forfeit a car which allegedly had been used illegally to
transport liquors, illegally seized evidence would be inadmissible. If
the Court continues to apply One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, one should
not consider Janis as impliedly overruling that case.
VI. CONCLUSION
Every effort should be made by practitioners to limit Janis to its
narrow facts: the "silver platter" doctrine should apply in civil cases
only where the state officer has acted in "good faith," and only where
no federal participation is present in the search or seizure itself. The
case potentially poses a serious threat to the automatic exclusionary
rule in criminal proceedings. In addition, the courts are left with a
difficult factual determination of what constitutes "good faith" ac-
tion by law enforcement officers.
The language of Janis, particularly in Note One, indicates "good
faith" means that from all the facts adduced at trial the state officers
had proceeded in a reasonable manner and in accordance with the
legal requirements at the time the warrant was obtained and at the
time the search was made.9
4
Professor Wright's suggestions"5 may be compatible with Janis,
for he proposes that evidence be admissible in criminal trials if there
has not been a "substantial" violation of the fourth amendment by
the police. 9" Thus, a realistic possibility exists that courts could find
the absence of "good faith" anytime there has been a "substantial"
violation by the police.
In Janis, Officer Weissman clearly was acting in "good faith"; the
"1428 U.S. at 435. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), wherein the
Supreme Court refused to vitiate a search made in good faith, simply because the search
in question was followed by another decision, which would have made the search
illegal. The Court commented:
The teaching of these retroactivity cases is that if the law enforcement officers
reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they had seized was admissible
at trial, the "imperative of judicial integrity" is not offended by the introduc-
tion into evidence of that material even if decisions subsequent to the search or
seizure have broadened the exclusionary rule to encompass evidence siezed in
that manner.... [T]he "imperative of judicial integrity" is also not offended if
law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that their conduct
was in accordance with the law even if decisions subsequent to the search or
seizure have held that conduct .of the type engaged in by law enforcement of-
ficials is not permitted by the Constitution.
422 U.S. at 537-38.
"See Wright, supra note 51.
"Id. Professor Wright notes that the American Law Institute lists several factors to
determine whether police violations are "substantial." The most important of these
are: the extent to which the police have deviated from fourth amendment standards,
whether the violation was wilful, and whether exclusion of the evidence would act as a
deterrent. See generally, Loe, the ALl Substantiality Test: A Flexible Approach to the
Exclusionary Sanction, 10 GA. L. REV. 1 (1975).
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case which ultimately invalidated the warrant, Spinelli, had not been
decided at the time the warrant was issued. He could not be expected
to follow legal requirements of a case which had not been decided. In
contrast, a situation is found where police deliberately violate the
fourth amendment.
In between these two extremes is the case of a state officer who
tries to do his job correctly, in accordance with the Constitution, but
who fails to execute a legal search only because of his lack of
knowledge of the myriad of cases in the search and seizure area, or
because of a change in existing law. Evidence seized under those
situations should be admitted in a civil tax trial, for to do otherwise
would be to presume that the officer was not acting in "good faith."
Janis is limited to intersovereign, as opposed to intrasovereign,
seizures. One of the strongest reasons the Court gave for not ex-
tending the rule to the civil tax area was that state police would not be
deterred by such exclusion since the federal civil case falls outside "the
offending officer's zone of primary interest." 7 Conversely, since the
enforcement of the federal laws is within the federal officer's zone of
primary interest, one may argue that an intrasovereign transfer
(within the federal hierarchy) would require the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule.
With this conclusion in mind, taxpayer counsel should attempt to
prove that federal participation existed in a state search. In order to
ascertain when a state search becomes a federal one,9 courts must
now follow pre-Elkins law, such as the Byars case, and more recent
cases, such as Stonehill in the foreign search area.
A more far-reaching question is whether Janis represents the first
step toward abrogation of the rule as to all cases, both civil and
criminal. The rule will probably remain entrenched in the criminal
realm and will be replaced only after Congress follows suggestions
such as those suggested by Burger in his dissent in Bivens. To do
otherwise would leave search victims only with the general right to sue
federal or state officials in court, a situation that would lengthen
already burgeoning court dockets. A premature death of the rule
might also encourage illegal police activity, a situation proponents of
the rule fear will occur.
"1428 U.S. at 458.
"In Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), the Supreme Court held that if a
federal officer participated in the search before the search was completed, he was
deemed to have participated in it. The following recent cases support this general pro-
position: United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975) (federal participation
in existence where federal officials were present when airline employee opened luggage
without warrant or probable cause, and federal officials came prepared to conduct field
test on narcotics); United States v. Davis. 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (airline boarding
search part of an overall nationwide anti-hijacking effort, and constituted governmen-
tal action for purposes of fourth amendment); United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37 (5th
Cir. 1973) (federal participation present where federal officials had been informed and
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Janis apparently has settled fewer questions than it has raised. If
the seizing state officer has acted in "good faith," the IRS now can be
assured of using illegally seized evidence as a basis for assessment of a
civil tax. Such an assessment would be protected by the presumption
of correctness 9 which was unaltered by Janis. The Commissioner
could also utilize the presumption of correctness to support additions
to the tax, such as for failure to file a return or pay the tax, 0 or for
negligently or fraudulently failing to pay such tax.'01
The Janis decision may result in more aggressive cooperation be-
tween the two sovereigns in areas such as gambling and unbonded
whiskey. If such cooperation does materialize, courts predictably
may return to the Byars- Weeks-Mapp rationale to prevent police
abuse in the civil area.
The decision in Janis makes the taxpayer's rebuttal of such
presumptions more difficult, since he may not allege the issue of il-
legality in a "good faith" state seizure.' 0 2 Therefore, Janis leaves the
taxpayer with one main avenue of escape, to prove that the evidence
was obtained illegally and in "bad faith." If successful, the taxpayer
should be entitled to injunctive relief against assessment or
collection.' 0
two federal agents participated in search); United States v. Townsend, 394 F. Supp. 736
(E.D. Mich. 1975) (the test of joint participation not exclusive, the dominant theme be-
ing whether state officers cooperate for the benefit of federal sovereign).
"See pp. 14-15 of text accompanying note 77-79 supra.
1'0I.R.C. § 16651.
1- I.R.C. § 6653.
"'Previously, a tax was rendered illegal, and thus uncollectable, if the basis for the
formulation of such tax was illegally seized evidence. Pizzarello v. United States, 408
F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969). The court there refused to supply injunctive relief without
more information as to whether "irreparable harm" would occur to taxpayer if assess-
ment or collection were not enjoined. Nevertheless, it held that injunctive relief would
be appropriate in circumstances where the government's only basis for assessment was
illegally obtained evidence, as under no circumstances could the government ultimately
prevail.
'"Id. at 585-86. This presupposes two things: 1) that the government has no legal
evidence independent of the illegal taint, which could be used as a basis for assessment,
and 2) that the courts will not extend Janis to bad-faith violations. As to the injunctive
issue see generally, Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Laing v. United
States, 423 U.S. 161 (1974); and Comm'r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976).
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